




Deputy Executive Secretary for 
Economic and Social Development 
Gert Rosenthal 
Deputy Executive Secretary for 
Co-operation and Support Services 
Robert T. Brown 







ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
SANTIAGO, CHILE, DECEMBER 1985 
C E P A L 
Review 
Santiago, Chile Number 27 
CONTENTS 
Foreign policy and international financial negotiations: the external debt and the Cartagena 
Consensus. Jorge Eduardo Navarrete 7 
External debt: Why don't our governments do the obvious? Guillermo O'Donnell 27 
External debt and crisis: the decline of the orthodox procedures. Robert Devlin 35 
The external debt of the Latin American countries. Raúl Prebisch 53 
Latin America and integration: options in the crisis. Guillermo Maldonado Lince 55 
Trade and equilibrium among the ALADI countries. Jorge Torres Zorrilla and Eduardo Gana 69 
A two-front attack to overcome the payments crisis of developing countries. Fábio R. Fiallo 79 
The imperfections of the capital market. Eduardo Sarmiento 97 
The agriculture of Latin America: changes, trends and outlines of strategy. Joint ECIACIFAO 
Agriculture Division 117 
On the role of small and medium-sized enterprises in the improvement of the production 
structure of developing countries. Carlo Secchi 131 
Twenty-five years of the Inter-American Development Bank. Felipe Herrera 143 
A sélection of addresses delivered at the Expert Meeting on Crisis and Development in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Santiago, Chile, 29 April to 3 May 1985) 153 
CEPAL REVIEW No. 27 




From 1974, under pressure from the new trends in the 
world economy, international public financing began 
gradually to lose its relative importance for the Latin 
American countries. T h e growth of international 
monetary liquidity gave the international banking sys-
tem an unfamiliar weight in absolute and relative 
terms. However, the world recession persisted, and it 
became evident that our countries must again seek a 
response to their needs in bodies such as the Inter-
American Development Bank. 
In the author's view, the experience of the last 25 
years in Latin America shows that international public 
financing, from whatever standpoint, is an essential 
form of co-operation for the advancement of the re-
gion. 
CEPAL Review wished to draw attention to the im-
portance of the role played by the Inter-American 
Development Bank at a time when this institution has 
just completed a quarter of a century of activity on the 
regional and international scene. This article by its 
first President, Mr. Felipe Herrera, is published as a 
tribute to a sister institution. 
•First President of the Inter-American Development 
Bank-
I 
Some of the background to 
the founding of IDB 
A few years after the Second World War the 
countries of Latin America found themselves 
taking second place, in their efforts to obtain a 
greater amount of financial co-operation, to the 
great international priority which was given to 
the reconstruction of Europe and the economic 
development of Africa and some regions of Asia. 
The inflexibility of the working policies of the 
public authorities of the time was also subjected 
to universal criticism in the continent. Both these 
sources of dissatisfaction, together with the re-
gion's ancient aspiration to have its own regional 
financial system, transformed the establishment 
of a regional bank into a fighting banner in the 
inter-American economic forums. This aspira-
tion was not shared by the rulers of the United 
States in those years, who saw no point in creating 
new mechanisms and thought it preferable to 
make better use of the resources offered by pri-
vate capital, by Eximbank and by the World 
Bank. 
The initiation of the Marshall Plan in 1947 
encouraged the hope that the United States, 
following the pattern of the programme an-
nounced for Europe, would soon make major 
resources available for Latin American develop-
ment. These expectations proved false and a 
feeling of frustration surfaced at the Ninth In-
ternational American Conference (Bogotá, 
1948). At this Conference the countries of the 
region expressed their un happiness with the 
amount of resources allocated to them by bilater-
al and multilateral public bodies. To remedy this 
situation they formulated the idea of establishing 
an inter-American bank. In March of the follow-
ing year the Inter-American Economic and So-
cial Council (CIES) completed a study of the argu-
ments for and against the establishment of a re-
gional financial organ, without giving an opinion 
either way. Later, at the special sessions held in 
March and April 1950, this body adopted a 
resolution which stated: "in the present circum-
stances it does not seem feasible or advisable to 
set up institutions of this kind". 
At the Special Economic Conference (Quin-
tandinha, November 1954) Latin America put 
forward for the first time some concrete ideas on 
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the forms which inter-American cooperation 
should take. Although there was a feeling of 
scepticism at the meeting with regard to the 
viability of the proposed institution, at least in the 
short term, a decision was taken to establish a 
committee of experts made up of representatives 
of the central banks of nine Latin American 
countries to prepare and submit to the Organiza-
tion of American States within six months a plan 
for the creation of a regional financial body. The 
group of experts met at Santiago, Chile, in Febru-
ary 1955 and prepared draft statutes which were 
submitted to CIES SO that consultations could be 
held with all the countries members of the inter-
American system. Although this plan led to no 
immediate action and the idea of creating an 
inter-American bank was not taken up again un-
til later, the Santiago meeting had prepared a 
suitable framework for systematic study of this 
ancient Latin American aspiration. 
The OAS Economic Conference {Buenos 
Aires, August and September 1957) initiated a 
process of change in inter-American relations 
which culminated in Operation Pan America 
proposed by the President of Brazil, Dr. Jus-
celino Kubitschek, and supported by all the 
countries members of the system. Operation Pan 
America was a decisive factor in the establish-
ment of iDB not only because it included a 
mechanism of this kind among the measures it 
proposed but also because it influenced the 
United States to decide to review its policy of 
co-operation in the economic and social develop-
ment of Latin America. 
It must be recalled that at that time President 
Eisenhower, by proposing the establishment of a 
Regional Development Agency for the Middle 
East, with financial participation by the United 
States, had accepted the possibility of incorporat-
ing regional development instruments in the ex-
isting global systems. On 12 August 1958, at a 
special meeting of CIES, the Under Secretary of 
State announced that the United States was ready 
to participate in a regional financial organization 
such as the one proposed for Latin America. This 
coincided with the convening of a meeting of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs which was to be held 
in the following month with a view to analysing 
the proposals on which Operation Pan America 
was based. At that meeting the countries mem-
bers of the inter-American system supported the 
CEPAL REVIEW No. 27 / December 1985 
operation proposed by President Kubitschek and 
set up a group of experts to negotiate the agree-
ment founding the new regional financial organ. 
That decision initiated the last stage in the es-
tablishment Of IDB. 
The establishment of the Bank made a real-
ity of the ancient aspiration of the Latin Amer-
ican countries to have a regional financial instru-
ment in the management of which they would 
have an effective role. The Bank's long period of 
gestation was due to the need to combine in the 
planned institution its Latin American character-
istics and its incorporation in the inter-American 
system. Regionalism and multilateralism thus de-
termined the nature and essence of the new 
body. The original regional characteristics of IDB 
were expanded from 1976, and the Bank was 
transformed into an international organization 
with the admission of West Germany, Australia, 
Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Ita-
ly, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Yugoslavia. 
I personally had the honour from 1954 to 
1959, on behalf of my country first of all and also 
on behalf of other sister nations, to play a part in 
building on this initiative, especially in my capac-
ity as General Manager of the Central Bank of 
Chile and, later, as Executive Director of IMF, 
representing the Southern Cone. 1 was a member 
of the drafting and organizational committee of 
IDB and later, at the first annual meeting of the 
Board of Governors of IDB (San Salvador, Janu-
ary 1960) I was elected President of the institu-
tion, being re-elected in 1964 and 1968. 
In my speech of thanks after my appoint-
ment in San Salvador I had the following to say 
about the challenge which lay ahead of us: "The 
size and quality of the Bank will be determined by 
human and organizational factors and by the 
volume of resources available and the modalities 
for their utilization. The Bank's success will de-
pend basically on the people who run it. We must 
elucidate the true scope of the Inter-American 
Bank and stress that only a calm and solid be-
ginning and clarity of purpose will enable the 
inst i tut ion to grow and assume greater 
responsibilities. Those who expect so much of us 
must give us time and their good will in this 
period of formation and growth. We will search 
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diligently for the most suitable ways of making 
the Bank part of the collective awareness of our 
people. It has been judged necessary that the 
institution's headquarters should be in the 
United States, for convincing technical and prac-
tical reasons. This circumstance^ however, 
obliges us to be more vigilant than ever and keep 
in mind that the Bank exists to serve Latin Amer-
ica; the Bank and its staff must identify them-
selves with the vigorous and exciting reality of 
Latin America. We must create a sound and effi-
cient institution which will win the trust and gain 
The long process of gestation and negotiation 
described above produced a bank with clear 
objectives and characteristics laid down in its own 
Founding Agreement; however, it was the work 
of iDB itself which shaped its contours and de-
termined its image and nature. 
Attention must be drawn, first of all,, to its 
capacity to mobilize resources, not only among its 
founding members but also in other developed 
countries. A regional body is in the best position, 
together with the countries receiving the assis-
tance, to generate adequate local counterpart 
funds, IDB'Sexperience was very successful in this 
respect, since each unit of foreign currency made 
available was matched by the commitment of at 
least double the amount in local currency. 
Clearly, the object of stimulating local invest-
ment around an external input is to improve the 
whole mechanism of savings and investment in 
the developing countries in both public and pri-
vate spheres. 
Furthermore it is clear that the institution 
performed effectively in areas of action not cov-
ered by other bodies. We should mention in 
particular: 
a) The promotion of the balanced develop-
ment of the continent; to this end policies were 
adopted which gave priority to the relatively less-
developed countries and to the backward areas 
within each country. In my speech in San Salva-
dor I had put my views on this topic in the follow-
the interest of the capital markets; but we must 
also be ready with the same decisiveness and the 
same conviction for the Bank to live and develop 
with its roots in our own communities. The var-
ious factors which will influence the work of the 
Inter-American Development Bank and the 
specific circumstances of the framework in which 
it will have to act point to the complexity of our 
institution. It is a banking organization specializ-
ing in the regional financing of economic de-
velopment projects. However, while it is a bank, it 
is also 'something more than a bank"'. 
ing terms: "It is a fact that our continent, made 
up as it is of developing nations and regions, has 
areas which for complex reasons are more back-
ward than others. Our conception of the 
economic unity of Latin America cannot leave 
this reality out of account. Just as the backward-
ness of one part of a country can create serious 
problems for the whole national economy, so at 
the continental level areas or nations of marked 
underdevelopment can signify dangerous im-
balances and tensions for the economic, political 
and social future of our community of nations. 
Accordingly, on the basis of the resources avail-
able and the modalities established in our stat-
utes, we must give priority to the solution of 
these problems. We must not forget that we have 
not established an institution for individual na-
tions but for a whole continent in all its vigour". 
b) A high percentage of the Bank's portfolio 
was made up of loans for the strengthening of 
the region's physical infrastructure, because in-
frastructural shortcomings imposed a severe 
limit on the yield on any productive investment. 
The lack of an interlinked transport and tele-
communications network and the underutiliza-
tion of energy resources accentuated the dis-
tortions of a development process centralized on 
a few unconnected poles and hindered the con-
quest of the interior of Latin America and the 
processes of regional and national integration. 
c) International financing of the agriculture 
II 
The task of IDB 
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and livestock sector had been neglected before 
the establishment of the Bank; the Bank's work 
in this area therefore had a pioneering and 
stimulating value. The operations approved for 
projects of irrigation, agricultural diversifica-
tion, development of cattle farming, and live 
stock raising and marketing make IDB the princi-
pal source of external capital for agricultural de-
velopment in Latin America. 
d) The solid support of the industrial sector 
took the form of the massive Financing of nation-
al enterprises through global loans made to pro-
motional corporations and industrial banks and 
through direct operations and financing of in-
tra-regional exports of capital goods. The im-
portance of this latter programme should be mea-
sured not so much by the trade figures achieved 
as by its promotional effect. Latin American in-
dustry has also been stimulated by the purchase 
with Bank loans of goods and services in Latin 
American countries, many of which have been 
suppliers for project? "jianced by the Bank. In 
the San Salvador speech when I became the first 
President of the Bank I stressed that: "In the 
Bank's operations I give great importance to the 
ways in which it can work through national 
organs for the financing of economic develop-
ment, such as promotional corporations, de-
velopment banks, agricultural or industrial 
banks or similar financial bodies. The experience 
of these organizations and their knowledge of 
the economies and needs of their countries can 
make them useful channels for the Bank's re-
sources. There are large areas generally served 
by medium and small private businesses where 
we can help with our funds and increase the 
number of projects. It is perhaps in agriculture 
and livestock and in industry that our action is 
most needed and can be most productive. For 
these purposes we must also seek the support of 
private sources of local financing, especially 
through lending institutions and stock ex-
changes. From what I have said it is clear that the 
co-operation between the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank and promotional organs, pri-
vate and central banking systems and the finan-
cial market in each country will naturally be very 
close". 
e) The Bank has given priority to urban de-
velopment in view of the intense concentration of 
population in Latin American cities resulting 
from the modernization of agriculture and the 
advance of industrialization. The Bank has 
attached great importance to financial, technical 
and institutional co-operation for the establish-
ment and improvement of the infrastructure in 
member countries. 
f) Since technological capacity is one of the 
most dynamic factors for development, financial 
support has been given for higher education and 
training. The Bank has joined in the efforts of 
the Latin American countries to increase the 
capacity and improve the quality and efficiency 
of their university and technical educational sys-
tems. The operations of IDB have been aimed 
mainly at strengthening those academic in-
stitutions which are most effective in the training 
of human resources in productive activities and 
at introducing or consolidating fundamental re-
forms in the organization of educational in-
stitutions and in teaching methods and scientific 
and technological research. 
g) The importance of a regional bank in 
creating an institutional infrastructure for de-
velopment cannot be underestimated. Lending 
activities serve as a stimulus to the whole plan-
ning process, which developed in an interesting 
way in the 1960s, and to the establishment and 
improvement of promotional organs of various 
kinds. A regional body also serves as a real uni-
versity for development, not only because of the 
exchange of experience among its staff members 
but also because of the multiplier effect which 
they have when they return to take up key posi-
tions in their own countries. 
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III 
IDB'S innovative plans 
In all this work an effort has been made to act 
pragmatically, blending economic investment 
with social and "hard" financing of highly pro-
ductive projects with "soft" financing. An 
attempt has been made to reduce the imbalance 
between countries with different levels of de-
velopment and even between areas of unequal 
development within a single country. The aim 
has been to surmount the barrier between the 
public and private sectors, taking as the guideline 
the decisions of the Governments themselves: 
support has been given to state and public enter-
prises if in the opinion of the Government they 
are the main agents of national development, or 
to private business if the Government decided to 
channel international resources in that direction. 
The guiding criterion has been more effec-
tive and better utilization of the resources. 
Together with this faithful interpretation of the 
objectives and targets established as their 
sovereign right by the countries themselves, 
efforts have been made to foster the capacity for 
innovation which is an essential requirement for 
success in a rapidly changing environment. The 
continuing search for new areas for financing, 
from education to tourism, from health to the 
financing of exports or exploitation of marine 
resources, despite the risks inherent in such in-
novations, has prompted other international 
bodies to follow in the steps of IDB. In the San 
Salvador speech I said: "These ideas lead us to 
the conclusion that in practice the Bank will sur-
mount the artificial distinctions between the 
public and private sectors which in theory should 
grow stronger. The level of importance of one or 
the other in the economic organization of the 
country depends on its particular institutional 
structure. It is not for the Bank to interfere in 
this. The coexistence of public and private enter-
prises is a fact of our communities: in its lending 
policy the Bank must concern itself only with the 
degree of efficiency with which these activities 
are run and with the benefit which utilization of 
its funds can bring to them and to the whole 
national economy". 
By increasing its "soft" lending the Bank was 
quickly able to achieve a proper balance between 
its social operations and its fundamental activity 
of financing economic projects. This original fea-
ture of the Bank as an organ for financing social 
development in Latin America may be found in 
embryo in the regulations governing its Fund for 
Special Operations established in the Founding 
Agreement. When the idea of the Inter-
American Development Bank was being dis-
cussed, the notion already existed that the bal-
anced development of the countries of the re-
gion would require less-conventional projects or 
ones which were less directly productive; by their 
very nature such projects would need to be fi-
nanced on more flexible terms. However, the 
Bank's work in the social sectors and the activities 
of the Fund for Special Operations increased 
considerably after the Act of Bogotá, signed at 
the end of the third session of the Special Com-
mission of the Inter-American Economic and So-
cial Council in September 1960, i.e. months be-
fore the programme of the Alliance for Progress 
of President J.F. Kennedy came into effect. 
The Act of Bogotá meant for the Bank and 
for the whole of Latin America not only the 
adoption of previously unknown operational 
modalities but also the acceptance of new doc-
trines. The Act recognizes that the impact of 
economic development programmes on the wel-
fare of the people tends to operate over the long 
term and, accordingly, it proposes a set of mea-
sures for social improvement, especially in rural 
development, housing, education and health. 
When the Act was signed, the United States an-
nounced that it was ready to contribute US$500 
million to the attainment of its objectives. The 
United States Congress allocated these resources 
as follows: US$6 million to the Organization of 
American States for collaboration with member 
countries in the preparation of their develop-
ment plans; US$ 100 million to the International 
Co-operative Administration (ICA) for bilateral 
grants or aid in education, public health and 
technical assistance; and US$ 394 million for the 
establishment of the Social Progress Trust Fund, 
which was to be administered by IDB, to support 
148 CEPAL REVIEW No. 27 / December 1985 
the efforts of those Latin American countries 
which were prepared "to initiate or expand effec-
tive institutional improvements and take steps 
for the effective utilization of their own re-
sources, with a view to achieving greater social 
progress and more balanced economic growth". 
On 19 June 1961, when IDB had just started op-
erating, the Trust Agreement was signed by the 
United States Government and the Bank, au-
thorizing the Bank to make loans from this Fund 
for the settlement and better use of land, housing 
for low-income groups, environmental sanita-
tion and higher education and training. The 
Bank was also authorized to give technical assis-
tance in those sectors. The Fund thus officially 
established the financing of social projects as one 
Another of the Bank's functions, which was im-
plicit in its Founding Agreement and which has 
been gradually developing over the years, was its 
role as promoter of Latin American economic 
integration. Although the use of the term "col-
lective development" in the basic Charter already 
contained in a way the concept of regional in-
tegration, the provisions of the Agreement de-
fining the Bank's functions referred essentially 
to the financing of national projects and activi-
ties. However, one of these provisions invests IDB 
with broader scope of action and assigns it the 
task of "co-operating with member countries in 
directing their development policies towards im-
proved utilization of their resources in a manner 
compatible with the objective of a greater com-
plementarity among their economies and pro-
motion of orderly growth in their external 
trade". Although these ideas do not cover every-
thing that is now understood by economic in-
tegration, they did provide a mandate which the 
subsequent development of Latin America and 
of the Bank itself helped to clarify. 
To this end, the Bank participated in the rich 
intellectual process of determining the scope of 
regional economic integration, a concept which 
was only just coming into its own at the beginning 
of the Bank's operational policies. 
In the early days there was some concern that 
the Trust Fund might distort the Bank's purpose 
and work by drawing it away from mainly 
economic projects. It must be remembered that 
at that time, when the member countries had 
hardly paid the first installment of their con-
tributions to Bank's regular and special re-
sources, the Social Progress Trust Fund repre-
sented a considerable increase in resources. To-
day we can see that no such distortion took place 
and that, although the Bank did considerably 
expand its role in the financing of social invest-
ment in Latin America, it did so without reducing 
the attention it gave to the economic sectors. 
of the 1960s. Nowadays there is often talk in the 
United States of the "golden sixties"; this term is 
also very appropriate for the new coming-
together in Latin America and the growth of 
prospects for the historic convergence of our 
countries in that decade. 
As the intellectual influence of the Bank in-
creased in the process of Latin American integra-
tion, there was increasing concern to invest these 
ideas with an operational foundation. At the 
fourth annual meeting of the Board of Gov-
ernors (Caracas, 1963) a mechanism was set in 
motion for the financing of intra-regional exports 
of capital goods, the objective being to make 
them competitive with imports from other re-
gions. The programme originally operated on 
the basis of lines of credit made available to 
national financial organs and at the start it had an 
allocation of US$ 30 million from the Bank's reg-
ular resources. The programme's success can be 
seen by the volume of trade stimulated, by the 
nature of the goods traded, which represented 
an innovation in the region's traditional trade 
flows, and by the institutional improvemets 
which resulted. The use of part of the Vene-
zuelan resources made available to the Bank in 
1975 to expand the financing of regional exports 
IV 
The integration bank 
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and the establishment in 1978 of the Latin Amer-
ican Export Bank (BLADEX), with its headquarters 
in Panama, constitute, in my view, interesting 
examples of the operation of this programme. 
T h e final launching of IDB as an integration 
bank dates perhaps from the sixth annual meeting 
of the Board of Governors (Asunción, 1965). At 
that meeting unanimous support was expressed 
for the so-called "document of the four", i.e. the 
report on speeding up the establishment of the 
Latin American common market which, at the 
suggestion of President Frei, had been prepared 
a few weeks earlier for all the Heads of State of 
the hemisphere by Raúl Prebisch (ILPES), Carlos 
Sanz de Santa Maria (CIAP), José A. Mayobre 
(ECLAC) and the author of this article in his capac-
ity as President of IDB. In the last part of the 
document we reaffirm our faith in the future of 
an integrated Latin America in the following 
terms: "We must learn to work together; we must 
build a community of Latin American peoples. 
We have still not been able to come to grips with 
this great task because we have not succeeded in 
breaking free from the mold in which our de-
velopment began in the 19th century. Separated 
from each other and with no active relations to 
bring them together in a vital union, each of our 
countries was headed at that time along separate 
paths towards two great world economic, politi-
cal and cultural centres. We lived in the light re-
flected from those centres, and this had pro-
found consequences for the Latin America of the 
past which are still felt in the present. Important 
elements of that situation still persist; and we 
must break free of them if we are to cope with a 
changing world and with the growing tensions in 
our own development. We must unite our efforts 
to overcome these and other obstacles to Latin 
American development and focus our efforts on 
the attainment of great common goals. It is not 
merely a question of responding to the demands 
of technology or of having to work together to 
gain more economic room and extend the cultur-
al, scientific and technological horizons. We 
must also do this in order to gain greater political 
weight in the international arena". 
T h e Bank's role in the integration process 
was rendered more effective by two initiatives: 
the establishment of the Institute for Latin 
American Integrat ion (INTAL) and the sub-
sequent establishment of the Preinvestment 
Fund for Latin American Integration. The idea 
of setting up an institute of this kind had already 
been proposed at the ALALC meeting in Mexico 
City in 1963. That meeting had discussed the 
need to create a mechanism to co-ordinate the 
various existing integration institutions in Latin 
America. As time was passing without anything 
being done along these lines, the Bank decided to 
set up an institution of its own to carry out train-
ing, research, dissemination and evaluation work 
in connection with regional economic integra-
tion. 
T h e Preinvestment Fund for Latin Amer-
ican Integration was established in 1966 on the 
specific instructions of the Board of Governors. 
The Fund had an initial capital of US$ 15 million 
taken from the resources for special operations, 
and the United States Government added a 
further US$ 3.5 million from the Trust Fund for 
Social Progress. The Fund's primary area of ac-
tion was the implementation of infrastructure 
projects of an integrational nature, especially in 
transport and communications, the organization 
of services at the regional level for the develop-
ment of economic areas including territory be-
longing to two or more countries, and the es-
tablishment and expansion of basic industries 
which sold to multinational markets or used inputs 
from several countries, etc. The Fund was very 
useful in speeding up the integration of the re-
gion's economy, for it facilitated the identifica-
t ion of new mul t ina t iona l investment op-
portunities. These developments were again rati-
fied in the 1967 Declaration of Punta del Este in 
which the Heads of State of the inter-American 
system recognized the priority which IDB should 
give in its work to the financing of multinational 
infrastructure projects, with a view to acceler-
ating the attainment of Latin American economic 
unity. It is a challenge for IDB to transform itself 
effectively into an integration bank. Not more 
than 10 % of the Bank's total lending is for multi-
national projects; we thus reaffirm our convic-
tion that IDB must be an instrument for promot-
ing the financial integration of Latin America by 
means of joint initiatives on the part of two or 
more countries. 
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V 
Final comments 
Clearly, the Financial and political environment 
in which the Bank operates is different in 1985 
from what it was in the early stages. It must be 
remembered that at the beginning of the 1960s 
economic inter-Americanism reflected a new 
concept of the responsibility of the United States 
towards Latin America; its best expression was 
the "Alliance for Progress". From 1968 Nixon 
and Kissinger changed the rules of the game by 
introducing a general policy of gradual abandon-
ment of the transfer of public resources from the 
industrialized countries to the third world. 
In the early 1960s the integration and re-
gional unification of Latin America accelerated 
swiftly with the establishment of ALALC and the 
Central American Common Market. In recent 
years this trend has taken a different turn, with 
greater emphasis on sectoral convergence. The 
Latin American Economic System (SELA) is an 
expression of this reality, IDB has secured a per-
manent presence in this process and has financed 
major multinational infrastructure projects. 
In May 1985 INTAL held a seminar to study 
the problem of financing the subregional organs. 
T h e Fund for the Development of the River Plate 
Basin (FONPLATA), the Central American Bank 
for Economic Integration and the Andean De-
velopment Corporation (CAF) took an active part 
in the seminar. This meeting noted the support 
which IDB had given to all the subregional financ-
ing systems and the present difficulties which 
those institutions were experiencing as a result of 
the restrictions imposed by the general indebted-
ness of Latin America. 
T h e Bank was born at a time when Latin 
America had fluctuating development rates, a 
negative t rade balance and low monetary re-
serves. In the 1970s the region achieved growth 
rates of 6 to 8 % ; its exports increased and di-
versified; and its monetary reserves climbed 
from US$ 3 thousand million to more than 
US$ 30 thousand million. In that context the 
volume of lending available from international 
bodies declined in importance for many countr-
ies, for they had new sources of internal and 
external investment produced by the changing 
terms of trade and of international financing. 
Unfor tunate ly , with the emergence of new 
economic and political conditions during that de-
cade, instead of progressing towards Latin 
American regionalism, the countries gave prior-
ity to poorly understood principles of economic 
freedom and abandoned a general tradition of 
d e m o c r a c y . In r ecen t years , however, in-
tegrationist and democratic beliefs have been re-
born in Latin America; paradoxically, this has 
been due in many cases to the new policies which 
were put into practice and which led to the ex-
cessive external financial indebtedness of the 
whole region. 
T h e internal composition of the Latin Amer-
ican conglomerat ion also underwent major 
changes which influenced the activities of IDB. At 
the beginning of the 1960s Brazil was still con-
sidered a risk by international financiers (it was 
IDB which reopened the door to international 
public credit for that country). Although Vene-
zuela was fighting to consolidate its democracy 
and stimulate its internal economic develop-
ment, it was still a long way off from its spectacu-
lar bonanza. In South America, the conditions in 
Bolivia, Uruguay and Ecuador reflected a situa-
tion of acute underdevelopment which has 
tended to improve in these last 15 years. The 
n i n e coun t r i e s of the Car ibbean, now in-
dependen t of the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands or in the process of decolonization, 
were not part of the regional system and had very 
few links with the majority of the Latin American 
nations. In contrast, between 1967 and 1969 Tri-
nidad and Tobago, Barbados and Jamaica, and 
more recently, Guyana, Bahamas and Suriname 
became members of IDB. 
W h e n IDB was established the only in-
dustrialized country to commit major resources 
to it was the United States. From 1962 the Bank 
began to win the financial collaboration of all the 
capital-exporting countries. In 1972 Canada be-
came a member and since 1976 17 developed 
nations from outside the region have become 
share-holders; at this point the Bank ceased to be 
an organ limited strictly to the hemisphere and 
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE IDB / Felipe Herrera 151 
became increasingly cosmopolitan. 
One of the acid tests for the Bank was its 
access to the international capital markets, which 
it secured throughout these years on excellent 
terms and with the technical support of a first-
class portfolio. 
In the early days the Bank's operational 
activities were considered heterodox by many 
people, as it sought pragmatically to overcome 
the contradiction between conventional and soft 
loans, between public and private sectors, be-
tween financing and technical assistance, IDB was 
economic investment and social investment, be-
tween investment and preinvestment and be-
tween financing and technical assistance IBD was 
establishing itself in this way as the central bank 
for the development banks of Latin America, as 
the integration bank and as a truly thinking bank. 
At times it has been criticized for being a 
bank run by its debtors, i.e. in a Latin American 
spirit and with a Latin America majority, and it 
was alleged to have become politicized. I had to 
rebut those arguments at the end of my term of 
office in March 1971 when I said: "If this Bank 
had not been concerned and anxious to speed up 
development in Latin America with a view to 
integration and for the benefit of the majority, 
none of that political motivation would be what it 
is. And since in the 1970s it is very probable that 
the pluralist framework of Latin America will 
become broader and more complex, I believe 
that we will have to harness our goodwill and 
intelligence in the search for agreed formulas for 
combining the increasing centrifugal forces; and 
the only way of achieving such agreement is by 
appeal to higher political considerations". 
When I became President of the Bank in 
1960,1 defined our responsibility towards a bank 
which was at the same time "something more 
than a bank". I tried to be consistent with that 
belief for a whole decade ; at the conclusion of my 
term of office in March 1971 when I passed my 
functions on to the Bank's new President, my 
distinguished and capable friend, Antonio Ortiz 
Mena, I put it as follows: "Perhaps today we 
perceive with greater clarity all the things which 
we knew intuitively eleven years ago when we 
said that IDB was something more than a bank: a 
great regional public organ, with a solidly es-
tablished reputation and financial capacity, 
which reamins profoundly Latin American de-
spite the participation of the industrialized 
countries, with the ultimate objective not only of 
modernizing production structures and merely 
achieving economic growth, but also of enhanc-
ing the well-being of the great masses of the Latin 
American people. It is something more than a 
bank in the increasing orientation of its in-
stitutional efforts towards the promotion of the 
integrated development of our peoples and in its 
assumption of the functions of sounding board 
and spokesman for the interests of Latin Amer-
ica. In this contribution which the Bank can and 
must make to assist the countries of the whole 
region to find their own path of independent 
development and prompt their creative daring, it 
is worth recalling the words of that unforgettable 
public servant, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold: "Do not 
examine the ground before you take your 
next step: only the man who keeps his eyes fixed 
on the distant horizon will find his true path". 
